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Corporation tax rates significantly influence the location of foreign direct investment 
(FDI) as well as company decisions on corporate borrowing, transfer pricing, 
dividend and royalty payments, and research and development.  While direct taxation 
remains within the competence of individual EU member states, the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ) has faced an increasing number of corporation-tax-related cases over 
recent years and its judgements have significantly redrawn the European tax 
landscape.  The present paper reviews and synthesises these ECJ decisions and 
analyses their implications for the FDI decisions of Multinational Corporations. 
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  1Introduction 
There is a substantial body of evidence showing that effective corporation tax rates 
and the general tax landscape have a strong influence on the level of foreign direct 
investment (FDI) that a location can attract and on financing decisions associated with 
these investments.
1  In an early review of the empirical literature, Hines (1999) 
concludes that the evidence indicates that  “taxation significantly influences the 
location of foreign direct investment, corporate borrowing, transfer pricing, dividend 
and royalty payments, and R&D performance.”   
 
Work done since then has confirmed and strengthened these findings.  Desai, Foley 
and Hines (2003) use affiliate-level data for US companies investing abroad between 
1982 and 1997 to examine the relationship between effective corporation tax rates and 
investments by foreign-affiliate companies.  They find a strong negative effect, with 
an elasticity of around -0.5.  Allowing for elasticities to differ by host country/region, 
they find that tax effects are particularly strong in Europe, for which an elasticity of -
0.77 is found.  The work of Altshuler et al. (2001) suggests that the relevant elasticity 
has been growing over time. 
 
Grubert and Mutti (2000) and Slaughter (2003) also concentrate on the location 
decisions of US firms, while Gropp and Kostial (2000) present evidence on total FDI 
inflows and outflows.
2  The evidence is unequivocal that in circumstances where 
other locational factors – such as the existence of a pool of well qualified labour, 
reasonable infrastructure, business-friendly and robust political structures and 
membership of wider economic unions such as the EU – are similar, a lower rate of 
corporate tax can serve as a powerful tool to attract mobile international capital. 
 
Tax policy also affects the financing decisions of Multinational Corporations.  For 
example, if a US company investing abroad finances the investment with equity, its 
active profits in this case are taxable in the host country but free from tax in the US 
until repatriated.  Financing the investment through a loan from the parent company, 
on the other hand, gives rise to tax-deductible interest payments in the host country 
and taxable interest receipts in the US.  Thus there is an incentive to finance 
investments in high tax countries through debt and in low tax countries through equity.  
The empirical evidence is consistent with this hypothesis (Grubert 1998, 2000).  
These financial considerations can greatly influence the amount of tax paid in a low-
tax host country independent of the actual activity carried out there.  To satisfy taxing 
authorities in the donor country, however, some evidence of real activity in the host 
country is typically required. 
 
Transfer pricing, though strictly policed, is thought to allow some scope for firms to 
shift profits to low-tax locations by setting favourable intra-group trade prices. As 
Desai, Foley and Hines (2006) point out, “OECD governments require firms to use 
transfer prices that would be paid by unrelated parties, but enforcement is difficult, 
particularly when pricing issues concern differentiated or proprietary items such as 
                                                 
1 The effective tax rate is calculated by combining tax rates, which have been declining in most 
industrialised countries over recent decades, and the tax base, which has generally widened.  The 
literature also distinguishes between effective average and effective marginal tax rates; see e.g. 
Devereux, Griffith and Klemm (2002). 
2 Devereaux and Griffith (2002) present a survey of other work on the topic. 
  2patent rights. Given the looseness of the resulting legal restrictions, it is entirely 
possible for firms to adjust transfer prices in a tax-sensitive fashion without violating 
any laws.” Their analysis of affiliate-level data for American firms indicates that 
larger, more international firms, and those with extensive intra-firm trade and high 
R&D intensities, are the most likely to use low-tax environments. 
 
Hines (1995) argues furthermore that differences in royalty withholding taxes can 
partly explain differences in R&D activity by multinationals in different locations.  
His empirical analysis shows that affiliates of US multinationals are more R&D 
intensive if located in countries that impose high withholding taxes on royalty 
payments, suggesting that local R&D and imported foreign technology are 
substitutable to some extent. 
 
While direct taxation within the European Union remains within the competence of 
individual Member States, Member State powers must be exercised in accordance 
with Community law, and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been growing in 
importance as an arena in which jurisdictional battles over corporation tax matters are 
fought (Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Number of ECJ Cases Involving Direct Taxation, 1992-2006 
 
 
Source: European Commission, Taxation and Customs Union 
 
 
The present paper reviews and synthesises these ECJ decisions and analyses their 
implications for the FDI decisions of Multinational Corporations.  Section 2 provides 
background detail on the role and procedures of the ECJ while Section 3, which 
comprises the bulk of the paper, discusses ECJ decisions under a number of headings, 
including controlled foreign company legislation, treatment of cross-border losses, 
cross-border transfer of assets, thin capitalisation/transfer pricing rules, cross-border 
transfer of assets, taxation of dividends, exit taxes and double taxation treaties.  The 
FDI implications of the ECJ decisions reached are discussed at the end of each sub-
section.  The final section of the paper offers some concluding comments. 
 
                                                 
3 The classic statement from the ECJ in relation to direct taxation was set out in Schumaker where the 
Court stated that: “although, as Community law stands at present, direct taxation does not as such fall 
within the purview of the Community, the powers retained by the Member States must nevertheless be 
exercised consistently with Community law”; (Case C-279/93) [1995] ECR I-225, para.21. 
  32.  The Role and Procedures of the European Court of Justice 
The role of the ECJ is to uphold the Treaties of the European Union and to ensure that  
European law is uniformly interpreted and applied throughout the Union. It has 
jurisdiction in disputes involving Member States, EU institutions, businesses and 
individuals.  Over recent years it has played an increasingly significant role in shaping 
Member States’ tax regimes. 
 
While direct taxation remains outside the competence of the Community, the Court 
has consistently reaffirmed that national tax laws must respect the fundamental 
freedoms which are provided for by the EC Treaty and which seek to prohibit 
discrimination based on nationality.
4  If a conflict arises between Community law and 
the law of a Member State, Community law prevails.  If national courts experience 
difficulty in interpreting Community law, they may require a ruling from the ECJ on 
the issue in question.   
 
When faced with referrals from Member States regarding the compatibility of national 
tax provisions with Community law, the ECJ uses certain criteria to weigh the 
measures in question.  The two cornerstone principles of the ECJ’s approach to 
safeguarding the EC Treaty are (1) the prohibition of discrimination, direct or indirect, 
and (2) the prohibition of restrictions on the exercise of the fundamental freedoms, 
which include:  
−  Freedom from discrimination on grounds of nationality (Article 12) 
−  Free movement of goods (Articles 28 and 29) 
−  Free movement of persons (Article 39 to 42) 
−  Freedom of establishment (Article 43 to 48) 
−  Freedom to provide services (Article 49 to 55) 
−  Free movement of capital (Article 56 to 60) 
 
Any national tax measures which infringe on these freedoms are invalid unless they 
can be justified by the relevant Member State. 
2.1 Non-Discrimination 
One of the fundamental principles in Community law is the principle of non-
discrimination.  Direct discrimination involves differentiation based on nationality (of 
an individual or of the corporate seat of a company), while indirect discrimination 
involves differentiation based on criteria other than nationality.  Once discrimination 
has been identified, the next step is to determine whether that difference in treatment 
can be justified on any grounds.  In some instances, discrimination may be justified on 
the basis of the public interest, though it has become almost impossible for Member 
States to succeed in justifying measures which the ECJ has found to be contrary to the 
principles enshrined in the EC Treaty.   
 
When determining whether or not a particular measure is discriminatory, the ECJ 
typically compares the situation of residents and non-residents.  It is only in cases 
where a resident and non-resident are in ‘objectively comparable situations’ that 
discrimination may be at issue.  The Schumaker case was important because it 
                                                 
4 By way of contrast, the EC Treaty (Article 93) contains specific provisions in relation to the 
harmonisation of indirect taxes, to ensure the establishment and effective functioning of the internal 
market.  This has resulted in a strong harmonisation of indirect taxes, particularly VAT.   
  4established the ECJ view that residents (subject to unlimited or worldwide taxation) 
and non-residents (subject only to limited or source taxation) do not normally find 
themselves in comparable situations, as a result of which they do not have to be 
treated in the same way.
 5 
 
The issue of whether companies are in ‘objectively comparable situations’ is 
somewhat different however and the comparison has tended to focus on whether a 
non-resident company is granted the same beneficial tax treatment as a resident 
company.  For example, in the case of the Royal Bank of Scotland the ECJ ruled that a 
higher rate of tax could not be imposed on the profits of a branch of a foreign 
company as opposed to that applied to domestic companies. This was seen as an 
example of direct discrimination.
6    
 
The ECJ has also compared and provided equal treatment to: 
•  Two resident subsidiaries, one with a resident parent company and the other 
with a parent company resident in another EU Member State.
7   
•  Two resident parent companies, one with domestic subsidiaries and the other  
with foreign subsidiaries.
8 
•  Two resident companies, one with a domestic branch and the other with a 
foreign branch.
9 
2.2 Fundamental  Freedoms 
Apart from the prohibition against discrimination, the ECJ has held that any measures 
which apply without distinction but which restrict the exercise of the fundamental 
freedoms are also prohibited.  These are known as non-discriminatory restrictions and 
are often referred to as hindrances, obstacles or barriers.  In the context of corporation 
tax, the most important of the freedoms are the freedom of establishment provisions 
contained in Articles 43 and 48 and the free movement of capital provisions in 
Articles 56 and 58. 
Freedom of Establishment 
Article 43 of the EC Treaty provides that restrictions on the freedom of establishment 
of nationals of a Member State in the territory of another Member State are prohibited.  
Article 43 includes the right to set up companies (primary establishments) and 
agencies, branches or subsidiaries (secondary establishments) in any of the Member 
States.  Article 48 provides that companies or firms formed in accordance with the 
law of a Member State and having their registered office, central administration or 
principal place of business within the Community must be treated in the same way as 
natural persons who are nationals of Member States. 
 
The question of what level of holding or participation in a company is required for the 
freedom of establishment provisions to apply was considered in Baars.
10  The Court 
indicated that a national of a Member State who had a holding in the capital of a 
                                                 
5  (Case C-279/93) [1995] ECR I-225. 
6  Royal Bank of Scotland plc v Ellinko Dimosio (Greek State) (Case C-311/97) [1999] ECR I-2651. 
7  See Lankhorst (Case C-324/00) [2002] ECR I-11779 and Metallgesellschaft Ltd. and Others (Case 
C-397/98) & Hoechst AG, Hoechst UK Ltd. (Case C-410/98) [2001] ECR I-1727.  
8  See Bosal (Case C-168/01) [2003] ECR I-9409 
9  See AMID (Case C-141/99) [2000] ECR I-11619. 
10 C. Baars v Inspecteur der Belastingdienst (Case C-251/98) [2000] ECR I-2787. 
  5company established in another Member State which gave him “definitive influence 
over the company’s decisions and allowed him to determine its activities” was 
exercising his right of establishment.   
 
In X & Y v Riksskatteverket and De Baeck v Belgium,  the Court indicated that it was a 
matter for the referring court to establish whether the freedom of establishment 
(Article 43 EC) or the free movement of capital (Article 56 EC) applied.
11   If the 
required degree of participation for the purposes of freedom of establishment does not 
exist, then the refusal of a tax advantage may constitute a restriction on the free 
movement of capital. 
Free Movement of Capital 
Article 56 provides that all restrictions on the movement of capital between Member 
States and between Member States and third countries are prohibited.  Restrictions on 
payments between Member States and between Member States and third countries are 
also prohibited. 
 
In the context of companies, the ECJ looks at two questions to determine whether 
there is a restriction on the free movement of capital: (i) is the provision liable to 
dissuade residents of a Member State from investing their capital in companies 
established in other Member States?, and (ii) is the provision of the Member State 
liable to constitute an obstacle to companies established in other Member States 
wishing to raise capital in that Member State?  If either or both of the above questions 
are answered positively, the provision constitutes a restriction on capital movements.  
 
Article 58 provides for a limitation on the free movement stipulated in Article 56.  It 
allows Member States to apply provisions of their tax law which distinguish between 
taxpayers who are not in the same situation with regard to their place of residence or 
with regard to the place where their capital is invested.  It also allows Member States 
to take all requisite measures to prevent infringements of national law and regulations, 
in particular in the field of taxation and the prudential supervision of financial 
institutions, or to lay down procedures for the declaration of capital movements for 
purposes of administrative or statistical information, or to take measures which are 
justified on grounds of public policy or public security.  However, any such measures 
and procedures cannot constitute a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised 
restriction on the free movement of capital and payments contained in Article 56. 
 
In theory, therefore, Article 58 allows different tax treatment of residents and non-
residents and of domestic and foreign source investment income.  However, as we 
will see from the case law of the ECJ, this does not give Member States a carte 
blanche to introduce measures which lead to arbitrary discrimination or disguised 
restrictions on the free movement of capital.   
 
Interaction between the Treaty Articles 
To date, the case law of the ECJ in corporate tax matters has concentrated more on the 
freedom of establishment than on the free movement of capital.  Both Article 43 on 
freedom of establishment and Article 56 on free movement of capital may be 
applicable in a case involving a direct investment.  When cases are brought under 
                                                 
11  (Case 436/00) [2002] ECR I-10829 and (Case C-268/03) [2004] ECR I-05961 respectively. 
  6both headings, the ECJ tends to look at the case under the freedom of establishment 
principle first and, if it finds a breach of that freedom, it does not continue on to 
examine the case under the free movement of capital provisions.  
 
3.  Recent Relevant European Court of Justice Rulings 
Controlled Foreign Company Legislation 
A parent company resident in State A is generally not taxable on the profits of a 
subsidiary resident in State B until those profits are distributed back to the parent 
company in the form of dividends.  Contrary to these principles, however, controlled 
foreign company (CFC) legislation is designed to tax the parent company on the 
profits of a CFC (for example a subsidiary) resident in another State.  A CFC is a 
company which is resident outside the home country, controlled by persons resident 
in the home country and subject to a lower tax rate in the country in which it is 
resident.  CFC legislation taxes in the home country the income that arises in the low-
rate country as if that income had been distributed to the home country, even though it 
has not.  The rules aim to protect the domestic tax base from erosion.   
 
The UK introduced CFC legislation in 1984 to stop UK groups of companies from 
reducing their UK tax liabilities by diverting their profits to foreign group companies 
in low-tax territories.  In April 2004, the Special Commissioners in the UK referred 
the Cadbury Schweppes case to the ECJ regarding the compatibility of the UK (CFC) 
legislation with the free movement of establishment, services and capital.
12  The issue 
concerned two Irish indirect subsidiaries of Cadbury Schweppes plc which were  
located in the International Financial Services Centre in Dublin and subject to a 10 
percent rate of corporation tax in Ireland.  Under its CFC rules the UK Inland 
Revenue had taxed the UK parent on the undistributed profits of the Irish subsidiaries.  
 
Advocate General Léger issued his opinion in May 2006.  He concluded that Articles 
43 EC and 48 EC do not preclude such national tax legislation if the legislation 
applies only to wholly artificial arrangements intended to circumvent national law.  
According to the AG, such legislation must enable the taxpayer to be exempted by 
providing proof that the controlled subsidiary is genuinely established in the State of 
establishment and that the transactions which have resulted in a reduction in the 
taxation of the parent company reflect services which were actually carried out in that 
State and were not devoid of economic purpose with regard to that company’s 
activities. 
 
The AG rejected the UK view that the motives for establishing a subsidiary and for 
the choice of country in which to establish it can constitute a relevant criterion.  In 
other words, the existence of a wholly artificial arrangement cannot be inferred from 
the parent company’s avowed purpose of obtaining a reduction of its taxation in the 
State of origin. 
 
The ECJ delivered its decision in September 2006.  The Court agreed with the AG’s 
view that the UK’s CFC legislation could apply only to wholly artificial 
arrangements.  The Court affirmed its earlier case law to the effect that the mere fact 
                                                 
12 Cadbury Schweppes plc and Cadbury Schweppes Overseas Ltd. v Commissioners of Inland Revenue 
(Case C-196/04).   
  7that a resident company establishes a secondary establishment, such as a subsidiary, in 
another Member State cannot set up a general presumption of tax evasion and justify a 
measure which compromises the exercise of a fundamental freedom guaranteed by the 
Treaty.  The UK CFC legislation clearly constituted a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment.  The Court held that in order for a restriction on the freedom of 
establishment to be justified on the ground of prevention of abusive practices, the 
specific objective of such a restriction must be to prevent conduct involving the 
creation of wholly artificial arrangements which do not reflect economic reality, with 
a view to escaping the tax normally due on the profits generated by activities carried 
out on national territory. The restriction must not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve that purpose.   
 
Such tax measures must not be applied where it is proven – on the basis of objective 
factors which are ascertainable by third parties – that, despite the existence of tax 
motives, a CFC is actually established in the host Member State and carries on 
genuine economic activities there.  Thus availing of a lower tax jurisdiction cannot of 
itself  be grounds for CFC treatment  The attractiveness of the tax regime is accepted 
to be as legitimate a factor as any other in a company’s choice of location.   
 
The Cadbury Schweppes decision meant that countries with CFC legislation would 
have to review these rules to ensure their compatibility with EC law.  The FDI 
implications of the decision will clearly be to increase the attractiveness of lower-tax 




Treatment of cross-border losses 
Companies are generally regarded as separate legal entities for tax purposes.  
However, in recognition of the fact that groups of companies may comprise a single 
economic entity, many countries operate some form of “group relief” under which the 
losses of one company in a group may be set off against the profits of other group-
member companies.  The problem is that such off-set is generally confined to cases 
where the surrendering company and the claimant company are both tax resident in 
the relevant State.  The general justification for denial of relief for cross-border losses 
is that the profits of foreign subsidiaries are not within the charge to tax in the relevant 
State. 
 
In its 2003 Communication, the European Commission noted that the “ current limits 
to cross-border relief within the EU, in particular as regards subsidiaries, can lead to 
(economic) double taxation and constitute significant obstacles to economic activity 
in more than one Member State.” 
14 
 
In Futura Singer, the ECJ appeared to accept that a tax rule confining compensation 
for losses to losses economically related to income received locally was justified by 
the principle of territoriality.  However, the judgment did not elaborate on the 
                                                 
13 Ireland is one such case, in that it does not meet the OECD (2001) criteria for a harmful tax haven.  
These are: (i) no or very low taxes, (ii) a lack of exchange of information, (iii) lack of transparency and 
(iv) no substantial activities in the country. 
14 COM (2003) 726 final. 




In the case of ICI, the ECJ considered the UK’s consortium relief (a form of group 
relief) which was available solely to companies which controlled subsidiaries whose 
seat was in the UK.
 16   ICI claimed that the legislation represented a restriction on its 
right to establish subsidiaries in other Member States.  The ECJ agreed that Article 43 
of the Treaty precluded legislation such as the UK’s which made this form of tax 
relief subject to the requirement that the holding company’s business consisted wholly 
or mainly in the holding of shares in subsidiaries that were established in the UK.  
This case is argued to have spelled the “beginning of the end for the concept that the 
Member States retained total sovereignty over their direct tax affairs” (Craig, 2003).   
 
The question of cross-border losses also arose in AMID.
17 AMID was a Belgian  
limited company which had its seat in Belgium but also carried on business in 
Luxembourg through a permanent establishment (i.e. a branch, office or agency as 
opposed to a subsidiary which is a separate legal entity).  Under the terms of a double 
taxation treaty between Belgium and Luxembourg, AMID’s income from its 
permanent establishment in Luxembourg was exempt from tax in Belgium.  The 
Belgian business incurred losses in some years before returning to profitability, while 
the Luxembourg business made profits throughout the relevant periods.  
 
Belgium refused to allow AMID to deduct losses incurred by its Belgian 
establishment in the previous year from the profits made by it in the subsequent year, 
on the ground that those losses should have been notionally set off against the profits 
made by its Luxembourg establishment in the previous year.  The point was that if the 
permanent establishment had been established in Belgium, the losses could have been 
set off against the income of the company.  The ECJ ruled that by notionally setting 
off domestic losses against profits exempted by the double taxation treaty, the Belgian 
legislation established a differentiated tax treatment as between Belgian companies 
having establishments only in Belgium and those having establishments in another 
Member State.  Such legislation constituted a hindrance to Belgians wishing to invest 
outside Belgium and therefore contravened Article 43. 
 
This case could be seen as the forerunner to the well-known Marks & Spencers case, 
on which the ECJ gave its decision in  December 2005.
18  When the Marks & 
Spencers case was initially considered by the UK Special Commissioners they viewed 
it as different from AMID because Marks & Spencers concerned subsidiaries rather 
than permanent establishments.  
 
Marks & Spencers had established retail operations in other EU member states 
including France and Belgium and these operations were carried on through locally-
established subsidiaries.  When these ventures proved unsuccessful, the company 
                                                 
15 Futura Participations SA and Singer v Adminstrationdes contributions (Case C-250/95) [1997] ECR 
I-2471. 
16 Imperial Chemical Industries plc (ICI) v Kenneth Hall Colmer (Her Majesty's Inspector of Taxes) 
(Case C-264/96) [1998] ECR I-4695. 
17 Algemene Maatschappij voor Investering en Dienstverlening NV (AMID) v Belgian State (Case C-
141/99) [2000] ECR I-11619.  
18 Marks & Spencer plc v HM Inspector of Taxes;  Case C-446/03.   
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profits.  This was refused by the UK tax authorities on the basis that the subsidiaries 
were operating outside the UK, and the case went to the ECJ. 
 
The UK tax legislation was doubly called into question; firstly, because it did not 
accord the same advantages to parent companies with foreign subsidiaries and parent 
companies with foreign branches, and secondly because it placed groups of 
companies wishing to establish themselves abroad at a disadvantage in relation to 
groups resident in the UK.   
 
The Court noted that the UK group relief provisions constituted a tax advantage for 
the companies concerned. By speeding up the relief of the losses of the loss-making 
companies by allowing them to be set off immediately against the profits of other 
group companies, such relief conferred a cash advantage on the group.  The exclusion 
of such an advantage in respect of the losses incurred by a subsidiary established in 
another Member State which did not conduct any trading activities in the UK was of 
such a kind as to hinder the exercise by that parent company of its freedom of 
establishment by deterring it from setting up subsidiaries in other Member States. 
 
The Court then considered whether the restriction could be justified.  The UK and 
other Member States had argued that in the context of the group relief system, 
resident subsidiaries and non-resident subsidiaries were not in comparable situations.  
They pointed out that in accordance with the principle of territoriality applicable both 
in international law and in Community law, the Member State in which the parent 
company was established (the UK) had no tax jurisdiction over non-resident 
subsidiaries.  The ECJ was of the view that the fact that a Member State did not tax 
the profits of the non-resident subsidiaries of a parent company established in its 
territory did not in itself justify restricting group relief to losses incurred by resident 
companies.  
 
The United Kingdom and the other Member States which submitted observations put 
forward three factors to justify the restriction.  First, that in tax matters profits and 
losses are two sides of the same coin and must be treated symmetrically in the same 
tax system in order to protect a balanced allocation of the power to impose taxes 
between the different Member States concerned. Second, if the losses were taken into 
consideration in the parent company’s Member State they might well be taken into 
account twice.  Third, if the losses were not taken into account in the Member State in 
which the subsidiary was established there would be a risk of tax avoidance.   
 
The Court agreed, “in the light of those three justifications, taken together”, that the 
restrictive provisions pursued legitimate objectives compatible with the Treaty, that 
they constituted valid public-interest reasons, and that they were apt to ensure the 
attainment of those objectives.  The phraseology used by the Court however makes it 
difficult to discern the particular weight attached to each justification.             
 
The Court nevertheless concluded that the measures were excessive, and that the 
member state of the resident company should allow relief for losses when the non-
resident subsidiary had exhausted all the possibilities available for having the losses 
taken into account in its state of residence.  The Court explained this caveat on the 
basis that to deny group loss relief in such circumstances would go beyond what was 
  10necessary to attain the essential part of the objective of achieving a balanced 
allocation of tax jurisdiction.  Advocate General Geelheod is of the view that this 
caveat should be applied extremely restrictively.
19  
 
The Marks & Spencers case was highly controversial and was watched closely by all 
Member States with corporation tax systems containing similar group relief 
provisions.  Meussen (2005) indeed suggests that the case was “one of the most 
important, if not the most important, case concerning EU corporate tax”. 
 
By offering the possibility that a group of companies might be able to transfer their 
losses to the Member States which apply the highest rates of taxation, the judgement 
should serve to reduce the disincentive effect of high tax rates for FDI inflows. 
 
Cross-Border Transfer Of Assets 
Most Member States operate some form of group relief which allows intra-group 
transactions on a tax-free basis.  The problem is that these provisions are not usually 
extended to cross-border situations.  The thrust of EU rulings is that they should be.   
 
X AB and Y AB concerned a Swedish group relief scheme that allowed tax-free 
transfers of assets between group companies.
20  Both companies had to be resident in 
Sweden, though relief was also available if the Swedish subsidiary was wholly owned 
by the Swedish parent indirectly by way of wholly-owned intermediate companies in 
another Member State.  However, the relief was denied if the Swedish subsidiary was 
wholly owned by way of wholly-owned intermediate companies in more than one 
other Member State.  The ECJ held that this was clearly in breach of the right of 
establishment under Article 43. 
 
The case Metallgesellschaft & Hoechst was not directly concerned with the cross-
border transfer of assets but rather related to the UK’s advanced corporation tax (ACT) 
system.
21  A subsidiary member of a group did not have to pay ACT on dividends 
paid to its parent so long as both companies were resident in the UK.  The ECJ held 
that groups of companies with a foreign parent company could not be treated 
differently from groups of companies with a domestic parent company.    
 
The extension of group relief to cross-border situations is likely to enhance 
multinationality (i.e. the extent to which firms have operations outside their home 
location or are headquartered abroad) and lead to increased FDI flows. 
 
Thin Capitalisation/Transfer Pricing Rules 
If a parent company injects funds into a subsidiary in the form of a capital loan 
instead of a capital contribution (equity), the profits of the subsidiary are transferred 
to the parent company in the form of deductible interest rather than non-deductible 
dividends.  If the two companies are in different countries, the tax debt can be 
transferred from one country to another at the will of the parties concerned.  As noted 
earlier, similar considerations make it more attractive to use inter-company debt to 
expand in high-income-tax countries and to use equity to expand in low-tax countries.  
                                                 
19 Opinion on Class IV ACT Group Litigation (Case C-374/04) 23 February 2006 at para. 65. 
20 X AB and Y AB v Riksskatteverket (Case C-200/98) [1999] ECR I-8261. 
21 Metallgesellschaft Ltd. and Others (Case C-397/98) & Hoechst AG, Hoechst UK Ltd. (Case C-
410/98) [2001] ECR I-1727.  
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Thin capitalisation rules are intended to prevent the arbitrary transfer of the tax debt 
from one country to another and to ensure that the tax is charged in the country where 
the profit is actually made.  The rules operate by imposing an “arm’s length” rate of 
interest, and disallowing for tax purposes any interest paid in excess of this. They also 
apply to companies whose capital structure is disproportionately biased towards loan 
capital rather than equity. The whole of the relevant interest charge is disallowed 
when such fat debt financing is found to occur.  
 
Transfer pricing rules are similar to these thin capitalisation rules in imposing arm’s 
length prices on cross-border transactions within a group.  The application of transfer 
pricing rules solely to non-domestic transactions could be considered discriminatory 
and contrary to EC law.   
 
The question arising in the case of Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v Finanzamt Steinfurt 
was whether subsidiaries established in Germany were treated differently depending 
on whether or not their parent company had its corporate seat in Germany.
22   The 
German company Lankhorst-Hohorst's sole shareholder was Lankhorst-Hohorst BV, 
which had its registered office in the Netherlands.  The sole shareholder in Lankhorst-
Hohorst BV was Lankhorst Taselaar BV, whose registered office was also in the 
Netherlands. The Netherlands (grand)parent company granted a loan to Lankhorst-
Hohorst in Germany and the dispute concerned the interest paid by the German 
company on foot of this loan.   
 
The German tax authorities treated the interest paid to the Dutch company as a 
distribution of profits and taxed it as such.  The German provisions were not directly 
linked to nationality, but to whether the taxable person enjoyed a tax credit.  
Lankhorst-Hohorst argued that the loan by the Dutch shareholder was a rescue 
attempt by it and that the interest paid to that shareholder could not be classified as a 
covert distribution of profits.  It argued that the German provisions were 
discriminatory and consequently contrary to Article 43 in view of the treatment they  
afforded to German shareholders who were entitled to a tax credit (unlike the 
companies in the case, which had their corporate seats in the Netherlands).  
 
The ECJ found that difference in treatment between resident subsidiary companies 
according to the seat of their parent company constituted an obstacle to the freedom of 
establishment which was, in principle, prohibited by Article 43.  The tax measure in 
question made it less attractive for companies established in other Member States to 
exercise freedom of establishment and they may in consequence have refrained from 
acquiring, creating or maintaining a subsidiary in the State which adopted that 
measure. 
 
The German government, supported by the Danish and UK governments and the 
European Commission, sought to justify the measure on the basis that it was intended 
to combat tax evasion in the form of ‘thin capitalisation’ or ‘hidden equity 
capitalisation’.  The ECJ again pointed out that a reduction in tax revenue did not 
constitute an overriding reason in the public interest which could justify a measure  
contrary to a fundamental freedom.  It noted that the legislation in question did not 
                                                 
22 (Case C-324/00) [2002] ECR I-11779. 
  12have the specific purpose of preventing wholly artificial arrangements from attracting 
a tax benefit, but applied generally to any situation in which the parent company had 
its seat, for whatever reason, outside Germany.  Such a situation did not, of itself, 
entail a risk of tax evasion, since such a company would in any event be subject to the 
tax legislation of the State in which it was established. 
 
The Court also rejected the argument that the measure was needed to ensure the 
coherence of the applicable tax systems, ruling that coherence could only be used as  
justification of a discriminatory provision when discriminatory treatment of a 
taxpayer is linked to a benefit realised by the same taxpayer. 
 
Following this decision, many Member States had to re-design their thin-
capitalisation rules so as to eliminate unequal treatment of resident and non-resident 
EU companies.  There were two different national responses.  Spain, for example, 
amended its legislation to exclude EU companies from its thin capitalisation rules, 
while the UK extended its transfer pricing and thin capitalisation rules to cover 
domestic as well as international transactions.  The FDI implications of these 
responses are complicated.  The UK route will increase compliance costs within the 
UK and could drive investments away, while adoption of the Spanish model could 
increase the attractiveness of low-tax EU countries as holding-company locations for 
companies that benefit from thin capitalisation practices. 
 
Taxation Of Dividends 
All Member States levy some form of corporation tax on the profits of companies.  
When a company’s profits are distributed in the form of dividends, the dividends are 
then taxed in the hands of the shareholder.  This gives rise to what is referred to as 
“economic double taxation” – the same income is taxed twice in the hands of different 
taxpayers.   
   
The different approaches of Member States in relation to the taxation of dividends can 
give rise to difficulties.  Some Member States have had preferential tax arrangements 
that applied only to dividends from domestic shares, and the ECJ has found such 
provisions to be contrary to the free movement of capital. 
 
The taxation of dividends received by companies is to some extent covered by the 
Parent-Subsidiary Directive which provides for exemption from withholding taxes on 
the outbound payment of a qualifying dividend by a subsidiary or branch to its parent 
in another EU Member State and the grant of a tax credit or exemption from tax to the 
company receiving the inbound dividend.
23  
 
In 2003, the European Commission produced a paper entitled “Dividend taxation of 
individuals in the Internal Market” in which it analysed the various dividend taxation 
systems of the then fifteen Member States.
24   The paper related to the dividend 
taxation of individuals only, noting that this is the area that is most problematic in 
practice.  It concluded that  
 
                                                 
23 Council Directive 90/435/EEC of 23 July 1990. 
24 COM 2003 810 final. 
  13“An analysis of the ECJ case law leads to fundamental conclusions about the 
design of dividend taxation systems: Member States cannot levy higher taxes on 
inbound dividends than on domestic dividends.  Likewise, they cannot levy 
higher taxes on outbound dividends than on domestic dividends.” 
 
The provisions of the EU Treaties relating to the free movement of capital were 
implemented by various directives, including Directive 88/361.
25  The case 
Staatssecretaris van Financien v B.G.M. Verkooijen was referred by the Netherlands 
to the ECJ to determine whether Article 1(1) of Directive 88/361 precluded a Dutch 
legislative provision which treated inbound dividends received from companies 
resident in other Member States less favourably than dividends received from 
domestic sources.
26    The ECJ ruled that it did, and rejected justification arguments 
based on the promotion of the economy, cohesion of the tax system, loss of revenue, 
and a possible tax advantage for taxpayers receiving in the Netherlands dividends 
from companies with their seat in another Member State. 
 
In Lenz, the ECJ examined the Austrian treatment of dividends received from capital 
invested in domestic companies and in other Member States.
27  Ms. Lenz, an Austrian 
resident, was unable to avail of the reduced tax rates applicable to dividends from 
Austrian companies because the dividends she received were from German 
companies.  The ECJ found that the tax legislation at issue had the effect of deterring 
taxpayers living in Austria from investing their capital in companies established in 
other Member States.  The legislation also produced a restrictive effect in relation to 
companies established in other Member States, in that it constituted an obstacle to 
their raising capital in Austria.  The legislation therefore constituted a restriction on 
the free movement of capital.  
 
The ECJ rejected submissions arguing that the measure was justified on the basis that 
the Austrian government was unable to levy tax on revenue from companies 
established outside their territory.  The court also rejected submissions in relation to 
the need to maintain coherence of the national tax system.  The aim of the Austrian 
legislation was to reduce the economic effects of double taxation of company profits 
(by way of corporation tax) and the taxation of a shareholder (by way of income tax) 
on the same profits distributed in the form of dividends.  The ECJ noted that apart 
from the fact that personal income tax and corporation tax were two distinct taxes 
which affect different taxpayers, the Austrian legislation did not make the obtaining 
of the tax advantages at issue (enjoyed by Austrian residents on their domestic 
revenue from capital) dependent upon the taxation of the companies’ profits.  
 
Similarly in Manninen the ECJ held that the Finnish tax credit system whereby 
individuals who received dividends from a Finnish resident company received a tax 
credit which was not available where the dividend was received from a company in 
another Member State (in this case Sweden) was a restriction on the free movement of 
capital and prohibited by Article 56 EC.
 28 
                                                 
25 Article 1(1) provided that Member States should abolish restrictions on movements of capital taking 
place between persons resident in Member States. To facilitate application of this directive, capital 
movements were classified in accordance with the Nomenclature in Annex I. 
26 (Case C-35/98) [2000] ECR I-4071.  
27 Anneliese Lenz v Finanzlanddesdirekiton fur Titol (Case C-315/02) [2004] ECR I-07063. 
28 (Case C-319/02) [2004] ECR I-07477. 
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The cumulative effect of the Verkooijen, Lenz and Manninen line of cases is that the 
less favourable treatment of inbound dividends is considered to be a restriction on the 
free movement of capital.  Hintsanen and Pettersson (2005) furthermore suggest that 
the Manninen case does not merely cover individual shareholders but also has 
relevance for corporate taxpayers. 
 
Equal treatment of domestic and inbound dividends could be ensured either by 
abolishing the exemption on domestic dividends or abolishing the corporation tax 
charge on foreign dividends. Abolition of the exemption on domestic dividends could 
lead to the restructuring of the financial architecture of companies in an attempt to 
avoid the resulting losses.   In either case, multinationality is likely to be enhanced. 
 
Exit Taxes 
Many Member States seek to tax their resident individual and/or corporate taxpayers 
on capital gains in respect of their assets.  In domestic situations, such capital gains 
will usually be taxed when realised, i.e. when the assets are sold or otherwise 
disposed of.  However, if an individual taxpayer moves to another Member State 
before selling his assets, his original state of residence risks losing the taxing rights on 
the capital gains which have accrued on those assets. Similarly, if a company transfers 
its residence to another Member State or transfers individual assets to its branch 
(permanent establishment) in another Member State (or vice versa), the original 
state of residence risks the partial loss of its taxing rights on the gains which have 
accrued while the company was resident in its territory. Many Member States have 
attempted to deal with this issue by taxing such accrued but as yet unrealised capital 
gains at the moment of transfer of the residence by the taxpayer or of the individual 
assets to another Member State. 
 
The European Court of Justice has stated that immediate taxation of latent 
capital gains on assets transferred to another Member State infringes the principle of 
freedom of establishment and has a dissuasive effect on taxpayers wishing to establish 
themselves in another Member State.
29 
 
Equivalent to the impact that employment protection regulations such as “firing costs” 
are found to have in reducing  aggregate employment (see e.g. Scarpetta, 1996), 
removal of such exit charges on companies may be deemed likely to increase 
multinationality. 
 
Double Taxation Treaties 
Double taxation arises where two countries impose taxes on the same income or 
capital.  This may arise where one country imposes taxes on the basis that an 
individual or company is tax resident there while another country imposes tax on the 
same item because the income arises there.  Article 293 of the EC Treaty provides that 
Member States shall, so far as is necessary, enter into negotiations with each other 
                                                 
29 According to a recent European Commission communication on this matter (“Direct Taxation: The 
European Commission proposes an EU-coordinated approach on exit taxation”,  IP/06/1829, Brussels, 
19 December 2006), member states should provide for an unconditional deferral of collection of the tax 
due until the moment of actual realisation.  It recognised however that this will not necessarily provide 
a solution for double taxation or unintended non-taxation which may arise due to mismatches between 
different national rules. 
  15with a view to securing for the benefit of their nationals…the abolition of double 
taxation within the Community.  Double taxation treaties seek to avoid or minimise 
such double taxation, typically by providing for an exemption or tax credit in respect 
of tax paid in the other contracting State.  The ECJ has consistently held that while 
Member States are free to allocate their powers of taxation bilaterally they are bound 
by the EC Treaty freedoms when exercising those taxation powers.
30 
 
The study Company Taxation in the Internal Market identified the area of double 
taxation treaties as a potential source of obstacles and distortions for cross-border 
economic activities within the EU.
31   In view of this, the Commission intends, 
following technical discussions with the Member States, to come forward with a 
communication on the need to adapt certain provisions of double taxation conventions 
based on the OECD model to comply with Treaty principles.   
 
One particular concern which has come to the fore recently concerns  provisions in 
treaties which favour residents of one country over others.  In the context of the EU, 
the adoption of the ‘most-favoured nation’ doctrine would mean that residents of a 
particular Member State should be able to avail themselves of tax advantages agreed 
between two other Member States with regard to their residents. 
 
The ECJ has recently been called upon to determine whether favourable provisions in 
a tax treaty between two Member States which are not extended to persons in a third 
Member State may be seen as a form of discrimination between non-residents.   
 
Normally only residents of the Contracting States to a tax treaty are covered by the 
provisions of the tax treaty.  The ECJ ruling on the Saint Gobain case however placed 
branches of non-resident companies on the same footing as resident subsidiaries as 
regards tax treaty benefits.  
 
While the D case involved an individual and was not directly related therefore to 
corporation tax matters, it is nonetheless relevant to the present discussion in that it 
raised the “most favoured nation” doctrine.
32   The Commission and the governments 
which submitted observations (clearly alarmed at the prospect of having to dismantle 
a whole plethora of bilateral tax treaties) argued that a Member State party to a 
bilateral convention was not in any way required, by virtue of the EC Treaty, to 
extend to all Community residents the benefits which it grants to residents of the 
Contracting Member State.  They referred to the danger which the extension of the 
benefits provided for by a bilateral convention to all Community residents would 
entail for the application of existing bilateral conventions, and of those which the 
Member States might be prompted to conclude in the future, and to the legal 
uncertainty which that extension would cause.  To their relief, the Court concluded 
that the fact that the reciprocal rights and obligations in the Netherlands-Belgium tax 
treaty applied only to persons resident in one of the two Contracting Member States 
was “an inherent consequence of bilateral double taxation conventions”.   
 
The general thrust of ECJ decisions in this area appears then to be that double taxation 
treaties are not under threat, though the question remains as to whether the ECJ will 
                                                 
30 See, for example, Gilly (Case C-336/96). 
31 SEC (2001) 1681 
32 D v Rijksbelastingdienst (Case C-376/03). 
  16take a different view when faced with a company entitlement as opposed to that which 
it took in the ‘D’ case which related to an individual.   
 
Another potential problem that may arise in relation to double taxation treaties relates 
to the anti-“treaty shopping” or “limitation on benefit” clauses which are contained in 
many treaties with third countries.  These clauses seek to confine treaty benefits to 
genuine residents of the two Contracting States only, and the Commentaries to the 
OECD Model Treaty specifically authorise their use. Terra and Wattel (2005) suggest 
that it may be possible for a Member State to justify existing clauses on the basis that 
no tax treaty would have been concluded at all if it had not agreed on the clause 
insisted upon by a third country.
33   The provisions generally exclude from treaty 
benefits, however, resident companies which are controlled by non-resident 
shareholders, even when these shareholders are resident in another EU Member State.   
While the “good residents” test in several Member State/US Treaties may safeguard 
the ‘limitation on benefits’ clauses from ECJ attack, it remains to be seen whether the 
reasoning in the Open Skies cases may be further extended.   In these (non-tax) cases, 
the court struck down a similar nationality clause in the bilateral aviation agreements 
of eight Member States with the US.
34  Treaties concluded after the Open Skies case 
and containing limitation on benefit provisions may be found to be in violation of the 
fundamental freedoms.  
Concluding Comments 
When examining cases for compatibility with the provisions of the EC Treaty, the 
ECJ has been seen to adopt a three-step approach.  It first asks if there has been a  
breach of one of the fundamental freedoms enshrined in the Treaty.  If the answer is 
yes, it then asks whether the measure can be justified by pressing reasons of public 
interest.  If the answer is again yes, it asks if the measure is proportionate, in the sense 
of not going beyond what was necessary to ensure achievement of the aim in question. 
 
Member States have invoked justifications based on overriding public-interest reasons, 
but each of the following attempted justifications has been rejected, in one way or 
another, by the ECJ: 
−  the risk of tax avoidance.  The ECJ consistently rejects this justification if 
the legislation at stake does not have the specific purpose of preventing 
wholly artificial arrangements. 
−  the loss of tax revenue.  A reduction in tax revenue cannot be regarded as 
an overriding reason in the public interest to justify a measure which is in 
principle contrary to a fundamental freedom. 
−  other tax advantages.  Unfavourable tax treatment contrary to a 
fundamental freedom cannot be justified by the existence of other tax 
advantages, even if those advantages exist.  
−  the existence of lower tax rates in other Member States. 
–  that harmonisation has not been achieved.  In the absence of harmonisation 
at Community level, the Member States must nevertheless comply with 
Community law. 
                                                 
33 The clauses are particularly common in treaties concluded with the US, indicative of US insistence 
on their inclusion.   
34 (Cases C471-472/98 and 475-476/98) [2001] ECR I-9427. 
  17−  the effectiveness of fiscal supervision/administrative difficulties;
35 
−  the absence of reciprocal treatment under a double tax treaty: Treaty rights 
are unconditional and cannot be made subject to the contents of a tax 
treaty. 
−  aims of a purely economic nature, such as the intention to promote the 
economy of the country by encouraging investment by individuals in 
companies with their seat in that country. 
–  other advantages enjoyed by the person suffering from the restriction. 
 
Other than in the Marks & Spencers case, where the ECJ accepted a combination of  
three justifications (broadly: territoriality, cohesion of the tax system and tax 
avoidance), ECJ decisions have almost invariably privileged EU rules on the freedom 
of capital movements over the attempts of national Finance Ministries and Tax 
Authorities to protect their corporate tax bases.  Indeed challenges brought by 
taxpayers have had a success rate of more than 90 percent.  These decisions therefore 
have potentially strong effects in facilitating and supporting further FDI flows and the 
transnationalisation of companies across the EU.
36 
 
The need to uphold Community law is the foundation stone for ECJ decisions which 
appear to encroach on the realm of Member States’ sovereignty in relation to direct 
taxation matters.  The ECJ does however recognise that “it is neither the intention nor 
the avowed aim of Community law to call in question the limits inherent in any power 
of taxation, or to disturb the order of priority of the allocation of tax competences as 
between Member States … and, in the absence of Community harmonisation, the 
Court is not competent to interfere in the conception or organisation of the tax 
systems of the Member States”.
37   
 
ECJ judgements in these matters however have served to increase pressures for tax 
harmonisation at the EU level and have strengthened the determination of certain EU 
member states to push ahead with proposals for a Common Consolidated Corporate 




                                                 
35  In Futura (Case C-250/95; 1997; ECR I-2471) the justification on the effectiveness of fiscal 
supervision was accepted in principle but the particular measure failed the proportionality test. 
36 Pavelin and Barry (2005) provide evidence on the geographic diversification (“transnationalisation”) 
across the EU of the 300 or so largest manufacturing firms in Europe in 1987 and 1993.  They show 
that the coming-into-being of the Single Market coincided with an increase in the number of these 
firms that were multinational (i.e. had production bases in other EU countries) and in the geographic 
diversification of firms that were already multinational. As predicted by the theory of the multinational 
corporation, furthermore, firms in R&D-intensive and advertising-intensive sectors were found to 
produce in a broader range of countries than firms in other sectors. 
37 Bachmann (Case C-204/90) [1992] ECR I-249, para.23. 
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